A Theoretical Model of Optimal Compliance Decisions under Different Penalty Designs in Emissions Trading Markets by Restiani, Phillia & Betz, Regina
ISSN 1835-9728 
 






A Theoretical Model of Optimal Compliance 
Decisions under Different Penalty Designs in 
Emissions Trading Markets 
 
Phillia Restiani and Regina Betz 
 






About the authors 
 
Phillia Restiani is a PhD student at the School of Economics and Centre for Energy and 
Environmental Markets at UNSW 
 
Regina Betz is Joint Director (Economics), Centre for Energy and Environmental Markets 
(CEEM), School of Economics, Australian School of Business, University of NSW 
 
E: r.betz@unsw.edu.au  
   21-Dec-10  2 
Environmental Economics Research Hub Research Reports are published by The Crawford 
School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, Canberra 0200 Australia. 
 
These  Reports  present  work  in  progress  being  undertaken  by  project  teams  within  the 
Environmental Economics Research Hub (EERH). The EERH is funded by the Department of 
Environment and Water Heritage and the Arts under the Commonwealth Environment Research 
Facility. 
 
The views and interpretations expressed in these Reports are those of the author(s) and should not 
be attributed to any organisation associated with the EERH. 
 
Because these reports present the results of work in progress, they should not be reproduced in 




























Crawford School of Economics and Government  
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY  
http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au 
   21-Dec-10  3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Abstract                      4 
1.  Introduction                  5 
2.  Enforcement of Emissions Trading Schemes          5 
3.  Penalty Design                  9 
4.  Model Assumptions                14 
5.  Fixed Penalty Rate                17 
6.  Make Good Provision                23 
7.  Mixed Penalty Design                30 
8.  Discussion                   37 
9.  Conclusion                  39 
References                    40   21-Dec-10  4 
Abstract 
This  paper  employs  a  theoretical  model  to  examine  compliance  incentives and  market  efficiency 
under three penalty types: the fixed penalty rate, which uses a constant marginal financial penalty; the 
make-good provision (quantity penalty), where each missing permit in the current period is to be 
offset with a ratio (restoration rate) in the following period; and a mixed penalty, which combines the 
two  penalty  types.  Using  a  simple  two-period  model  of  firm‟s  profit  maximisation,  we  analyse 
compliance  decisions  and  the  efficient  penalty  level  under  each  penalty  type.  Firms‟  compliance 
strategies are modelled as an irreversible investment in abatement measures and permit buying in the 
market. Our findings indicate that the penalty type does not affect compliance decisions provided that 
the  efficient  penalty  level  is  applied.  Market  efficiency  is  retained  regardless  of  penalty  types. 
Nevertheless,  the  mixed  penalty  design  provides  the  strongest  compliance  incentives.  Hence  this 
finding supports the practice in which this  penalty design is widely used in the existing and the 
proposed trading schemes. Furthermore, we discuss the policy implications of the findings with regard 
to permit price discovery process and the Australian proposal of tying the penalty level to the permit 
price. 
Keywords: emissions trading, penalty design, compliance 
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1.  Introduction 
In the past few decades, emissions trading schemes have played an important role as a market-based 
instrument used to tackle the problem of controlling air pollution. The critical issue of climate change 
has put the issue of the design for emissions trading markets into the spotlight, as efforts to put a price 
on carbon have seen a growing number of schemes implemented or developed all over the world. 
Emissions trading can achieve the targeted emissions reduction efficiently if the scheme is designed 
properly, and penalty design is a crucial feature needed to maintain the integrity of the environmental 
goal. A poorly designed scheme might not achieve its efficiency and, even worse, might distort the 
existing market without meeting its emissions reduction target. 
Despite  the  large  body  of  literature  regarding  enforcement  in  the  context  of  emissions  trading 
schemes,  very  little  research  discusses  the  effect  of  different  penalty  types  as  an  element  of 
enforcement. This essay looks at how penalty designs, in terms of penalty types and penalty levels, 
might affect compliance incentives and market efficiency. Three penalty types are considered: the 
fixed penalty rate; the make-good provision; and the mixed penalty, a combination of both penalty 
types. We use a simple analytical model at the firm level to assess different compliance incentives 
related to each penalty type and further analyse the implications of having a different penalty level 
from  the  efficient  level.  Market  efficiency  in  the  model  is  evaluated  in  terms  of  the  efficient 
production level, the abatement level, and permit holding under the conditions of firms‟ compliance 
and profit maximisation. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section two provides an overview of the studies on 
enforcement in emissions trading schemes and clarifies the motivation of this essay. Section three 
describes  each  penalty  design  and  its  application  in  the  existing  trading  schemes.  Section  four 
explains the basic assumptions used in each model, and sections five through seven discuss the model 
for  each  penalty  type.  Section  eight  discusses  the  implications  of  the  results,  and  section  nine 
concludes the findings. 
2.  Enforcement in Emissions Trading Schemes 
The use of tradable pollution permits as a market-based instrument has gained more popularity in 
recent  decades  due  to  its  advantages  over  the  command-and-control  approach  in  achieving 
environmental goals at the least possible cost. It was Coase (1960) who first proposed the idea of 
transferable property rights as a response to Pigouvian taxes to address externalities such as pollution. 
These  transferable  property  rights  are argued  to  offer  more  flexibility by  allowing  the  market  to   21-Dec-10  6 
distribute the rights to its highest value users. The concept of tradable permits was first applied in the 
context of water pollution  (Dales, 1968) and air pollution  (Crocker, 1966). A general theoretical 
framework by Montgomery (1972) proves that a tradable permit system can achieve efficiency for a 
given environmental target or emissions cap. 
Although the actual implementation of an emissions trading scheme began in the mid-1970s with the 
US Environmental Protection Agency Emissions Trading (EPA ET) for stationary sources, a large-
scale system was not created until the US Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) permit trading or Acid Rain Program 
was initiated in 1995 (Ellerman et al., 2003). The programme, which tackles SO2 as a local pollutant, 
is more successful than a standard approach not only in achieving its emissions target (addressing the 
effectiveness  criterion),  but  also  in  cutting  abatement  costs  (addressing  the  efficiency  criterion) 
(Ellerman et al., 2000).  
Recently, there have been more emissions trading schemes implemented to address global pollutants, 
such as greenhouse gases, wherein the concentration of pollutants in a particular area (hot spots) is not 
a problem. For example, the European Union introduced an emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) in 
2005 covering more than 30 countries today, and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiatives (RGGI) 
scheme, which began in 2009, is the first large-scale mandatory cap-and-trade system for greenhouse 
gases in the US, covering ten states. Australia developed its first trading scheme in 2003 with the 
implementation of the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme (GGAS). Whereas the 
EU ETS and RGGI are cap-and-trade system, the GGAS requires participants, who are electricity 
retailers and  other individual participants, to  meet  a benchmark level of  emissions reductions by 
undertaking  project-based  emissions  reduction  activities.  The  scheme  is  basically  a  baseline-and-
credit system in which a credit is awarded to a facility that reduces emissions beyond the pre-specified 
emissions  baseline  or  benchmark.  These  credits  must  first  be  certified  and  can  then  be  used  for 
compliance or traded with another facility (New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme, 
2008). Although the scheme claims to have made significant reductions, from 8.65 ton CO2/capita to 
7.27  ton  CO2/capita  (Independent  Pricing  and  Regulatory  Tribunal,  2009),  it  has  been  severely 
criticised  for  a  number  of  design  problems,  such  as  the  fungibility  of  its  emissions  reductions 
activities, imputed emissions, its methods of calculating the baseline, and its complicated baseline 
rules, which are believed to result in a price that is much lower than the true scarcity price of carbon 
(MacGill et al., 2006). 
In spite of the potential that emissions trading markets offer, in practice, some issues can have adverse 
effects on the efficiency of the market. Stavins (1995) points out some examples of these issues, such 
as market power in the permit market, market power in the product market, non-profit-maximising 
behaviour, pre-existing regulatory environments, and the degree of monitoring and enforcement. It is 
argued  that  the  presence  of  transaction  costs  will    impact  efficiency  through  higher  marginal   21-Dec-10  7 
abatement  costs  for  permit  buyers  (Stavins,  1995)  and  a  reduced  number  of  trading  participants 
(Gangadharan,  2000).  Likewise,  under  the  presence  of  market  power,  dominant  firms  might 
manipulate  permit  markets  to  their  own  advantage,  making  total  pollution  control  costs  more 
expensive than the efficient level (van Egteren and Weber, 1996, Hahn, 1984). 
It is important to recognise that the environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency of a tradable 
permit system depend, among other things, on the enforcement mechanism used to encourage the 
compliance of market participants. An enforcement mechanism can include a number of elements: 
penalty design in terms of level and type, reporting procedures, the verification of reports, monitoring, 
and  sanctioning.  Furthermore,  each  of  these  elements  entails  some  cost.  Three  different  penalty 
designs  can  be  distinguished:  1)  a  fixed  financial  penalty  rate per  missing  permit,  which  can  be 
thought of as a „price penalty‟; 2) a make-good provision requiring firms to surrender missing permits 
at a given restoration rate or make-good factor, which can be thought of as a „quantity penalty‟; or 3) 
a  mixed  approach  combining  the  price  and  quantity  penalties  (henceforth  referred  to  as a  mixed 
penalty). In general, most existing trading schemes have shown compliance rates that are very high 
compared  to  those  achieved  under  the  regulatory  emissions  standard  approaches.  The  chosen 
enforcement mechanism may not only have a direct impact on firms‟ compliance decisions (whether a 
firm chooses to be compliant or non-compliant) but may also indirectly impact permit prices, which 
might in turn influence the ability of the programme to achieve potential cost savings and related 
economic benefits (Murphy and Stranlund, 2006). Other factors apart from the penalty design itself 
that might influence compliance decisions under emissions trading programs are the risk attitudes of 
market participants, the probability of an audit, flexibility in banking (saving permits for future use) or 
borrowing (using future permits in the current compliance period), initial allocation rules, trading 
rules such as auction rules, and any form of market failure, including market power, transaction costs 
and uncertainties.  
The work on compliance decision and enforcement builds from  Becker‟s (1968) on the economics of 
crime and punishment. The first theoretical work on enforcement in the area of environmental policy 
was conducted by Downing and Watson (1974) and focused on standards and effluent fees. Further 
work on pollution permits was conducted by Malik (1990), who examined market efficiency in the 
presence of non-compliance and found that compliance decisions will affect the demand for permits 
and can shift the equilibrium permit price upward or downward, resulting in lower market efficiency.  
Following those early works, numerous studies on enforcement models in emissions trading markets 
have been conducted. Under the presence of market power, the initial allocation of permits to the 
dominant  firm  can  be  used  as  an  enforcement  tool  in  which  the  regulator  can  control  policy 
parameters specifically for the price-setting firm rather than adjusting them for all firms (van Egteren 
and Weber, 1996). However, when marginal enforcement cost is increasing in the initial allocation of   21-Dec-10  8 
permits to the dominant firm, then the initial permits should be distributed such that the dominant firm 
becomes a net buyer (Chavez and Stranlund, 2003). Keeler (1991) studies compliance decisions under 
marginal penalty functions with different shapes. Baldursson and von der Fehr (2004) and Stranlund 
(2008) take into account the influence of risk aversion on compliance. The observed phenomenon of 
high compliance rates in spite of less frequent inspections or non-severe penalties for discovered 
violations has been explained using dynamic enforcement models by Greenberg (1984), Harrington 
(1988),  Landsberger  and  Meilijson  (1982),  and  Stranlund  et  al.  (2005).  Theoretical  analyses  of 
compliance rules in the context of the Kyoto Protocol and its effects on permit price are assessed by 
Nentjes and Klaasen (2004) and Godal and Klaasen (2006). Furthermore, Stranlund et al. (2005) study 
the effect of high penalties on reporting violations (submitting false data) rather than permit violations  
(failing to hold sufficient allowances) under permit banking provisions. 
These existing studies have emphasised the effects of monitoring, different audit probabilities and 
penalty  rates,  targeted  enforcement,  self-reporting,  and  cheating  as  important  factors  in  the 
enforcement of emissions trading schemes. However, we believe that even in cases where we have 
perfect  monitoring and sanctioning  mechanisms as  well as  costless sanctioning, the behaviour of 
market participants might still be influenced by different penalty types.  
This paper aims to use a simple analytical model to assess how different penalty types, specifically the 
fixed penalty rate, make-good provision, and mixed penalty design, can affect compliance decisions 
and the efficiency of emissions trading markets. We seek to contribute to the existing literature by 
focusing on the following aspects: 
1)  The effects of penalty design on compliance incentives  
To  our  knowledge,  only  a  few  of  the  existing  studies  focus  on  penalty  design.  Nentjes  and 
Klaasen  (2004)  look  at  the  compliance  incentives associated  with  the  Kyoto Protocol,  which 
include both a make-good provision and a fixed penalty rate. However, they do not undertake a 
theoretical analysis and do not focus on emissions trading. Moreover, they ground their analysis 
in the cost of reputation protection for buyers and sellers. Likewise, Godal and Klaasen (2006) 
use a game theoretical approach under the scenario of market power and US participation, and 
consider how these may affect committed parties on the road to final compliance under the Kyoto 
Protocol.  Some  studies  discuss  the  use  of  an  intertemporal  trading  ratio  to  discourage  the 
borrowing of permits that has a similar function to the ratio in the make-good provision (Kling 
and Rubin, 1997, Stranlund et al., 2005). However, Kling and Rubin (1997) do not focus their 
model on enforcement, while Stranlund et al. (2005) emphasize the use of tying the penalty to 
reporting violations. In contrast to those studies, we do not consider reporting violations, but   21-Dec-10  9 
rather focus on the equilibrium in a perfectly competitive permit market under different penalty 
designs.  
2)  We abstract from enforcement and monitoring costs or audit probability 
 As we want to isolate the effects of the chosen penalty type on compliance decisions, we assume 
that the violating firms will always be discovered and penalised. Meanwhile, numerous studies, 
such as those of Stranlund and Dhanda (1999), Sandmo (2002), and Arguedas (2008), consider 
audit probability as an important variable.  
3)  Our emphasis is on permit violation with regard to two main compliance strategies  
The  compliance  strategies  are  simplified  to  irreversible  investment  in  emissions  reduction 
measures and permit trading. We model an investment decision as an irreversible decision to 
highlight that, once the decision is made, it cannot completely be undone, because it has created a 
positive or zero sunk cost; e.g. the installed equipment cannot be removed simply, and its scrap 
value  is  insignificant  or  zero.  Furthermore,  we  follow  Kolstad‟s  (1996)  definition  of 
irreversibility, in which today‟s choices restrict tomorrow‟s choices. As such, we consider a two-
period model in which the investment decision must be made in the first period. 
Our theoretical model is built mainly on the work of Malik (1990) and Baldursson and von der Fehr 
(2004). Malik examines compliance decisions shaped by a marginal penalty rate as a function of 
violation and permit price, whereas Baldursson and von der Fehr consider how the initial allocation 
impacts  the  level  of  investment  in  pollution  reduction  under  the  assumption  of  risk  aversion. 
Baldursson and von der Fehr also incorporate the effects of aggregate-level and firm-level risks on the 
choice of investment level. However, they do not allow for non-compliance in their model. Although 
they take into account the idea of irreversible investment, they also add the option of undertaking 
incremental  abatement  measures that force firms to be compliant. This reduces the irreversibility 
effect of investment. We combine the models to examine the effects of penalty design on compliance 
decisions and investment level under the assumption of risk neutrality. 
3.  Penalty Design 
At present, different types of penalty designs have been adopted in emissions trading schemes (see 
Table 1). In general, three basic types of penalties can be distinguished: 1) a fixed financial penalty 
rate per missing permit (price penalty); 2) a make-good provision requiring firms to surrender missing 
permits at a given restoration rate or make-good factor (quantity penalty); and 3) a combination of the 
two penalty types, which we call a mixed penalty.   21-Dec-10  10 
A fixed penalty rate, henceforth referred to as an FPR, can provide an incentive and a clear signal of 
the  maximum  cost  of  compliance  for  firms.  The  FPR  acts  as  an  indication  of  the  maximum 
compliance costs for firms in choosing their compliance strategy: whether to invest in an abatement 
technology or to trade in the permit markets. Under some circumstances, a particular level of a fixed 
penalty rate may also act as a safety valve. The effective safety valve is triggered when the permit 
price rises above the chosen penalty level. In such a case, the emissions target is not achieved and 
firms pay the penalty, which is similar to a tax. In this light, we can view the safety valve as a hybrid 
instrument, a mix between a tradable permit and an emissions tax. This idea is presented by Jacoby 
and Ellerman (2004) and is similar to a concept proposed by Roberts and Spence (1976).  
There are two ways of implementing a safety valve. Firstly, firms can buy additional permits from the 
government  or  the  market  at  a  fixed  price  to  meet  their  obligations  and  remain  compliant.  The 
limitation of this approach is that it does not guarantee that the targeted level of emissions reduction 
will be achieved, because firms can buy as many permits as they want at this trigger price. Secondly, 
the companies can be temporarily (e.g. for a month) exempted from their obligation to surrender 
permits. This leeway will similarly compromise any progress made towards reaching the emissions 
target and undermine the cap-and-trade system. The two approaches have different implications with 
regards to the compliance status, because the first approach does not automatically ensure that firms 
will be in compliance once the safety valve is triggered whereas the second approach does. A critical 
issue with the design of safety valves is the price level, which can be used to maintain the emissions 
target. When the trigger price is set at a relatively low level, the trigger price becomes an effective 
price cap (price limit) on the cost of polluting or a binding price ceiling for the permit price. Hence, it 
indicates the maximum compliance costs. If it is set at a relatively high level, the trigger price acts as 
a fixed penalty rate that deters firms from polluting. The issue of penalty level is crucial to the FPR 
design in practice because the regulator will not necessarily have the perfect knowledge with regard to 
damage costs, firms‟ marginal abatement costs, or even the current emissions levels, which are all 
important in setting the theoretical equilibrium permit price and the penalty level based on that permit 
price. 
The second type of penalty design is the make-good provision, henceforth referred to as the MGP, in 
which firms must compensate for their missing permits in one period at a particular make-good factor 
or restoration rate in the following period. In the Kyoto Protocol, there is also an additional rule that 
suspends the non-compliant firms in any particular year, keeping them from selling their permits in 
the following year (Betz et al., 2006). This MGP ensures that the environmental goal is achieved, 
because it reduces the allowable aggregate emissions in the following year should it be exceeded in 
the current year. Assuming that the number of permits allocated by the regulator remains the same 
every  year,  non-compliance  under  this  penalty  design  will  create  either  a  future  increase  in  the   21-Dec-10  11 
demand for permits to make up for non-compliance during the  current year or a decrease in the 
number of permits sold in the market because the non-compliant firms are not allowed to sell any 
permits. Thus, non-compliance in the current year will exert an upward pressure on future permit 
prices. Furthermore, this type of penalty introduces additional uncertainties, as the compliance costs 
are uncertain because they are linked to the future permit price, which is unknown. This is not the 
case  for  financial  penalties,  in  which  the  magnitude  of  the  marginal  penalty  rate  is  fixed  and  is 
publicly announced at the outset.   
Most emissions trading schemes employ a mix of the FPR and MGP penalty design. For instance, this 
is the case with the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, which is currently the largest trading programme 
(in terms of coverage) with over 12,000 installations. This mix of penalty mechanisms acts as a 
double  penalty  for  market  participants:  non-compliance  triggers  both  a  fixed  penalty  and  the 
requirement to surrender the required permits at a future date. On the one hand, this guarantees that 
the  environmental  target  will  be  attained,  but  on  the  other  hand,  it  may  increase  the  cost  of 
compliance. Some examples of penalty design in existing trading schemes are listed in Table 1.    21-Dec-10  12 
Table 1 Penalty Designs in Existing Emissions Trading Schemes 
Penalty 
type 
Schemes  Pollutants  Sector coverage  Penalty level  Compliance Rate and Permit price 
FPR 
 
NSW GGAS  6 GHGs** 
Electricity generators 
41 participants 
A$12.50 incl. taxes 
95% compliance rate, 0.01% carried 
forward shortfalls in 2008 
Average $5.85 spot price
a 
Chile  PM  680 sources emitting >1000m
3/h  Penalty fee  Low, then high
b 
LA RECLAIM  NOx,SOx 
292 facilities for NOx and 32 facilities for SOx 
(2009) 
$500/violation/day, determined by court 
95% for NOx, 97% for SOx (2009) 




US NOx Budget 
Program 
NOx 
2568 units of power plants and large combustion 
sources in eastern US 
Automatic quota reduction at 1:3 
Nearly 100% (2008) 





US Acid Rain  SO2  3456 electricity-generating units  Penalty $2000/ton + MGP 1:1 
100% (2008) 
$509(Jan) - $179 (Dec)
e 
EU ETS  CO2  Over 10,000 installations  Є100 (2008) + MGP 1:1 






Stationary energy, transport, fugitive emissions, 
industrial processes, waste and forestry sectors at 
the start 
Predetermined value or max. 110% of 
benchmark average auction price increased 
by 5% in real terms annually and MGP 1:1
g 
- 
RGGI (10 participating 
states) 2009 
CO2 
Fossil fuel electricity generators above a size 
threshold of 25 MW 
MGP 1:3 + penalty set by each state 
3 year control period 
June 2010 reserve price $1.86
h 
WCI (7 Western US 
States and 4 Canadian 
Provinces ) * 
6 GHGs** 
electricity generation, commercial and industrial 
combustion, and industrial process emissions; gas 
and diesel for transportation; residential fuel uses  
MGP 1:3 + penalty set by each state
i  - 
UK Carbon Reduction 
Commitment * 
CO2 
Large non-energy-intensive businesses and public 
sector entities that are not covered by the EU ETS  
Safety valve, linked to EU ETS, first set at 
£40
j 
Allowance price set at £12 in 
introductory phase 
New Zealand ETS  6 GHGs**  Forestry first, then all sectors by 2013 
Penalty NZ$30 + MGP 1:1 and can be 
raised to NZ$60 + MGP 1:2
k  - 
Note: * schemes are not implemented yet; ** CO2 - Carbon dioxide, CH4 – Methane, N2O - Nitrous oxide, PFCs – Perfluorocarbons, HFCs – Hydrofluorocarbons, SF6 - Sulphur 
hexafluoride  
Source: 
a Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (2009), 
b Montero et al. (2002), 
c Haimov (2010), 
d US EPA (2009b), 
e US EPA (2009a), 
f  EU Directive 2003/87/EC (2010b), 
Community Independent Transaction Log (2010a), 
g  The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2009), 
h Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative(2009), 
iWestern 
Climate Initiative (2010), 
j UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (2010), 
k   New Zealand Government (2007)  21-Dec-10  13 
These different penalty designs create different compliance incentives and have different effects 
on market efficiency. Compliance rates are generally very high, and have reached 100% in the 
US Acid Rain Program. The data show that higher penalty levels, through either an FPR, an 
MGP, or a mix of both, will encourage higher compliance rates. Slightly lower compliance rates 
than under the US Acid Rain Program, as experienced in the Los Angeles Regional Clean Air 
Incentives Market (LA RECLAIM) and Chile‟s TSP-Emissions Trading Program, are due more 
to  the  monitoring  and  enforcement  problems  in  those  schemes.  LA  RECLAIM  uses  a 
complicated procedure and an ad-hoc court approach in deciding the final compliance status of a 
violating  firm  (EPA  Clean  Air  Markets  Division,  2006).  This  approach  clearly  reduces  the 
influence of the very high marginal penalty rate on compliance and increases administration 
costs, although the compliance rate is still fairly high. In Chile, permit allocations are made 
using a proxy-based benchmark approach that has performed poorly with very limited historical 
emissions  information.  This  problem  was  exacerbated  by  poor  institutional  capacity,  which 
made  enforcement  more  difficult  for  the  programme  (Montero  et  al.,  2002).  Typically,  as 
markets  develop  over  time  and  more  firms  reveal  their  emissions  history,  the  authority‟s 
enforcement capacity is also enhanced.  
As shown in Table 1, most of the existing emissions trading programmes use a combination of 
the FPR and the MGP. Most of the schemes will also publish the non-compliance statuses of the 
firms in question, providing an additional incentive for compliance due to the risk for firms of 
losing their reputation. Apart from high compliance rates in those existing schemes, very limited 
information is available on the actual efficiency of those markets compared to their potential 
efficiency.  In  the  EU  ETS,  given  the  generous  allocation  and  mixed  penalty  design,  the 
compliance rate is very high. The New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme also 
shows a very high compliance rate, with only 0.01% of permit shortfalls being carried forward. 
It is important to note that, as the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme is a 
baseline-and-credit system rather than a cap-and-trade system (the latter being the focus of our 
study), it may offer different compliance incentives as participating firms act as suppliers of 
credit and the credit supply is not fixed. 
Drawing from the available empirical data, it is difficult to determine how market efficiency is 
impacted by penalty design. Because information on firms‟ actual emissions levels and marginal 
abatement costs are usually not known in practice, it is difficult to determine whether existing 
permit markets have achieved their full potential efficiency gains. Our theoretical analysis of an 
emissions trading scheme uses a stylised model that allows us to focus on a few choice variables 
related to compliance decisions under the assumed market setting. The simplicity of the model 
also  provides  insights  that  are  generally  applicable,  provided  the  assumptions  are  met.  The   21-Dec-10  14 
comparative statics of the model also provide us with straightforward implication of the effect 
of  a  particular  variable  on  the  variable  of  interest.  Therefore  the  analysis  of  compliance 
decisions and market efficiency under different penalty design merits the use of a theoretical 
model.  
4.  Model Assumptions 
Consider an emissions trading scheme that consists of n firms that are price takers in both the 
permit market and a downstream market, which is independent of the permit market. For a 
given quantity of outputs, the production activity of firm i generates emissions ei and revenues 
in which the price of the commodity,  , is exogenous. 
Firms  are  required  to  have  a  permit  for  each  unit  of  pollution  that  th ey  produce,  and  these 
permits  can  be  obtained  through  endowments  (as  in  the  case  of  free  initial  allocation  or 
grandfathering)  or  purchase  (as  in  the  case  of  auctioning).  There  is  a  central  authority  that 
conducts spot checks of reported data to prevent cheating and enforcement, ensuring that firms 
that  produce  more  emissions  than  is  allowed  by  the  number  of  permits  that  they  hold  are 
penalised.  
The central authority initially allocates free permits to firms or auctions those permits. Without 
loss  of  generality,  we  take  the  free  initial  allocation  of  permits  (grandfathering)  as  a  basic 
model, although the model also applies when permits are auctioned by holding the amount of 
free permits at zero. We define an initial stock of permits at time t in the market, t S , which is 
fixed over time and is the sum of gratis permits given to each firm,    it t s S . The aggregate 
emissions  level  in  the  business-as-usual  (BAU)  scenario, t E ,  is  the  sum  of  firms‟  BAU 
emissions levels    it t e E . Since the authority seeks to reduce the aggregate emissions level, 
the emissions cap or the permit supply is kept lower than the BAU emissions level,  t t E S  . 
The total number of permits in the market at the end of a compliance period t is denoted by  t L  
and  should  be  the  same  as the  initial amount  of  stock  because  we  are  considering  a  closed 
permit market that does not allow for linking with other permit systems.  
  n i E s S l L t it t it t ,..., 2 , 1    ;                    (1)   
where lit is the number of permit holdings of firm i at the end of compliance period t.  
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The compliance strategies consist of: 
1)  Investing in an abatement technology and/or  
2)  Trading permits.  
To inspect the effect of irreversible investment on enforcement in a permit market, we use a 
stylised two-period model. We model investment as an irreversible decision that will commit 
firms to undertaking abatement measures in the first period. Rather than including a lump sum 
investment cost in the model, the investment decision is indicated by a positive abatement level 
ai that will operationalise the same marginal abatement costs over time      i i it it a c a c  .  As 
investment decisions are irreversible and cannot be undone (and the associated costs cannot be 
recovered), we require that ai > 0. 
Firms are assumed to be price takers not only in output markets but also for permit markets and 
they differ in their marginal abatement costs,    i i a c  , which are continuous, increasing, and 
convex.    00 i c  , ca > 0 and caa > 0. A firm‟s output level is expressed as a function of capital, 
it k  , which is a production input that will have the main influence on emissions levels. 














          (2)
 
Likewise the firm‟s initial emissions levels are a function of their output level and technology 
parameter it.  
    it ti ti it k q h e  ,                    (3) 
We assume that an increasing production level will increase the firm‟s emissions levels at a 
decreasing  rate  and  that  the  same  applies  for  the  effect  of  better  technology  in  decreasing 
emissions levels.  























      (4) 
The regulator chooses the type of penalty in the form of a fixed penalty rate, denoted by f , or a 
restoration rate,  .
1   
The decision-making process in each period is as follows: 
 
                                                 
1 Many emissions trading schemes allow for banking and/or borrowing to provide more flexibility for 
firms dealing with price fluctuations due to external shocks. However, to keep the model simple and 
tractable, we do not allow for banking or borrowing in this paper or for trading in futures markets.   21-Dec-10  16 
 
1)  Information stage 
During this stage, firms receive both public or global information and private information 
pertaining to the permit market. When the information is public, a regulator announces the 
penalty type, its level and the initial allocation mechanism. When grandfathering occurs, the 
number of free initial permits allocated to each firm is fixed during each period and denoted 
by  0  i s . When an FPR is used, the authority announces the penalty rate  f , whereas the 
restoration  rate,   ,  is  revealed  if  a  make-good  provision  is  used.  In  the  mixed  penalty 
design, both  f  and    are declared. The penalty design variables are exogenous to firms. 
Firms also acknowledge that the probability of their being caught in a violation and the 
probability of their being sanctioned are equal to one (under perfect monitoring and penalty 
enforcement). Furthermore, penalty enforcement is assumed to be costless because this is 
not our focus. This information is also available to all firms. Thus, if their emissions level ei 
exceeds the number of permits held li, the penalty will be automatically enforced. 
Apart from public information, firms also receive private information regarding marginal 
abatement cost    i i a c ,  product price  and capital rent  r . Production level qi is used to 
generate the firm‟s total revenue; at the same time, production activity creates pollution and 
determines the firm‟s initial emissions level, ei, before an abatement measure is adopted.  
2)  Firms decide whether to invest in an abatement measure. 
3)  Firms trade permits in the market. 
When grandfathering occurs, firms learn about the permit price of the secondary market 
only after trading permits has taken place.. When permits are auctioned off, the auction 
price provides an early signal of the expected permit price. In this model, permit price,  p , 
is an exogenous variable because firms are price takers.  
4)  Compliance checks are carried out by the regulator, and penalties are imposed on non-
compliant firms. 
These stages are exactly the same for the two-period model that we have, with the exception 
that investment decision can only be made in the first period. The theoretical framework also 
builds on the assumption that the law of one price applies so that the auction price (in the 
primary market) is equal to the permit price in the spot markets (secondary markets). In the 
following sections, we will analyse the efficient market conditions that correspond to the three   21-Dec-10  17 
different forms of penalty design. It is important to note that the term “optimal” always refers to 
efficiency, which requires the attainment of potential cost savings in the market. We will use the 
terms “optimal” and “efficient” interchangeably in our discussion. 
5.  Fixed Penalty Rate 
With a fixed penalty rate the two-period model can be simplified into a static model, because 
there are no differences in market structure across the two periods and non-compliance will 
have  the  same  effect  by  the  end  of  each  period,  unlike  with  the  MGP.  Without  loss  of 
generality, we remove the time subscript t from our variables.  
Let  i e be firm i‟s initial emissions,  i s  be firm i‟s initial permits,  i a be firm i‟s abatement level, li 
be firm i’s number of permit holding, and    i i a c  be firm i‟s abatement investment costs. The 
firm‟s violation level is denoted by 
           0     i i i i i i l a k q e            (5) 
The firm‟s total costs are expressed as  
    i i i i p s f l a fv pd a c C
i i     
, , | ,             (6) 
where  i i i s l d   .  i d  specifies the number of permits traded by firm i in the market.  
When  0  i d , the firm is a net buyer, which means that by the end of a compliance period that 
firm buys more permits than it sells. Accordingly, if  0  i d , the firm in question is a net seller. 
The firm‟s profit function prior to an investment decision and trading in permits is expressed as  
  i i i i k r k q B                       (7) 
where    and  r symbolise  the  price  of  the  good  and  the  capital  rent.  These  parameters  are 
exogenous to the firm and hence are not the firm‟s choice variables. 
As we are interested in compliance decisions, the firm is allowed to choose a non-negative 
violation vi > 0. Firm i‟s profit maximisation function is 
i i i K l a Max
, ,
          i i i i i i i i i v f s l p a c k r k q                   (8)   
    subject to    0   , 0   , 0    , 0   , 0      i i i i i k l a e v  
The profit maximisation problem yields a Lagrangian equation:  
      i i i i i i i i i v v f s l p a c k r k q L                            (9)   21-Dec-10  18 
We derive the Kuhn-Tucker conditions as follows:  


























           (10) 
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              (12) 
    0     


i i i i i i l a k q e v
L

          (13) 












a ;      












        (14) 
Assuming an internal solution, we need to hold (11) and (12) equal to zero to obtain 
p f c f ai                    (15) 
A rational firm will choose its optimal investment in abatement so that marginal abatement 
costs are equalised across firms and will be the same as the equilibrium permit price p*. This is 
a common finding and highlights the advantage of a permit market. 
 
* p cai                  (16) 
An optimal compliance decision for the firm is obtained when (12) holds as equality when (13) 





,  which 
implies that compliance is efficient as long as the fixed penalty rate is equal to or higher than the 
equilibrium price. 
p f                   (17) 
This  is  the  usual  condition  for  achieving  perfect  compliance.  Using  this  logic,  tying  the 
marginal penalty rate to the equilibrium price will ensure that the penalty rate is above but very 
close  to  the  permit  price  and  hence  ensure  perfect  compliance  in  the  market  and  market 
efficiency as a result. However, this may in fact introduce additional uncertainty into the firm‟s 
decision-making process, because the marginal penalty rate will always change following the 
equilibrium permit price. In the efficient equilibrium, the firm‟s abatement level is equal to the 
difference between its emissions levels and number of permits that it holds. When the penalty   21-Dec-10  19 
level is set lower than the permit price, firms will chose to be non-compliant, and the aggregate 
emissions level will be higher than the number of permits in the market. A high emissions level 
will  also  drive  down  the  permit  price,  as  permit  demand  declines,  until  it  reaches  the  low 
penalty level. Hence, the emissions target will not be achieved. However, when the penalty level 
is set higher than the permit price, firms will be profit-maximizing by being compliant. 
At the equilibrium, there exists an efficient aggregate investment level for all firms such that 
     
* * * * p a c p a c i a i a  
  
          (18) 
     
* * 0 p l p a e v i i i i        
        
* * p l e p a i i i                 (19) 
When  incorrect  price  signals  are  transmitted  through  investment,  or  firms  have  incorrect 
knowledge about the equilibrium permit price, firms may over- or under-invest. Consequently, 
this will affect the demand for permits, which in turn will be reflected in the permit price. 
Hence, it will change the compliance incentives associated with a given penalty level in later 
periods.  
Proposition 1 Firms will find it optimal to comply as long as the marginal penalty rate is set 
greater than or equal to the equilibrium permit price. Q.E.D. 
Corollary 1 As the penalty rate increases, the amount of abatement will also increase or the 
output level will decrease accordingly until the efficient level is achieved. At the equilibrium, 
the firm’s marginal net benefit after taking into account the cost of compliance is equal to the 
firm’s marginal cost of production. 



















                   (20) 
Under a perfectly competitive permit market, we achieve the usual profit-maximising condition 
in which the firm‟s marginal benefit from undertaking a production activity, as expressed by the 
marginal revenue on the left-hand side, is equal to the sum of its marginal costs of production 
(capital rent) and its marginal compliance costs in the permit market on the right-hand side. As 
seen in the equation, this marginal cost is increasing in production level as the emissions level 
increases accordingly.   21-Dec-10  20 
We now use a simulation of the comparative statics to graph these effects, using the following 
functions and parameters:  02 . 0    , 15 . 0    , 05 . 0    ,     ,    ,
5 . 0 9 . 0 2       p r k q q e a c  . We can 
see that, as the penalty rate  f  increases, the violation level v decreases and then drops to zero 
when  p f  , the permit price (0.02), holding other variables constant (Figure 1a). This model 
confirms that firms will find it optimal to comply when the cost of being compliant is lower 
than the benefit of being non-compliant. 
 
  Figure 1 The Effects of Penalty Rates on Violation Levels, Compliance Strategies, 
and Production Levels under the FPR  
Since the model simplifies compliance strategies to making investment decisions in abatement 
measures and/or holding permits, it can explain very well the effects of the level of the penalty 
rate  on  both  of  these  options  (Figure  1b  and  1d).  When  the  penalty  rate  is  less  than  the 
equilibrium permit price, firms will not need to hold a single permit because it will be cheaper 
for  them  to  either  violate  when  their  abatement  cost  is  more  expensive  or  to  comply  by 
investing in abatement measure when the abatement cost is cheaper than the permit price.  
Considering that the model focuses on compliance decision and penalty design, the long-run 
incentive  of  making  an  early  investment  is  not  captured  in  the  model.  Rather,  investment   21-Dec-10  21 
decision is merely a compliance strategy. Thus, any compliance strategies in this model, either 
abatement investment or permit holding, are expressed mainly as costs (permit selling is carried 
out more as a strategy to minimize compliance cost). In this sense, increasing the penalty rate 
renders higher compliance costs, as firms need to hold permits in accordance with their output 
level. Consequently, firms reduce their output levels with increasing penalty rates up to the 
point where the penalty rate is equal to the equilibrium permit price, then firms achieve their 
efficient output level as expressed by the amount of capital use (Figure 1c). 
The permit market under FPR design will achieve its efficiency when firms choose their best 
compliance  strategies  at  the  equilibrium  permit  price.  When  a  firm  decides  to  make  an 
investment and also buy permits, it should choose an efficient mix of investment in abatement 
level  and  number  of  permit  holding. However,  if  the  firm  should  choose  either  one  of the 
available compliance strategies based on the information on the equilibrium permit price, then 
its  best  compliance  strategy  should  either  be  investing  in  an  abatement  measure  or  buying 
permits. In a permit market with a free allocation of permits (grandfathering), the choice of the 
firm‟s best compliance strategy will divide firms into two groups: net buyers and net sellers. 
Proposition 2  In a permit market with a fixed penalty rate in which the stock of permits is less 
than  the  aggregate  emissions  under  business  as  usual,  and  assuming  a  free  allocation  of 
permits, the firm’s best compliance strategy is to be a net seller when its marginal abatement 
cost  is  lower  than  the  equilibrium  permit  price,  and  to  be  a  net  buyer  when  its  marginal 
abatement cost is higher than the equilibrium permit price.  
Proof: Let E and Q denote the aggregate amount of emissions and the total production level, 
respectively, under the business-as-usual scenario.  
Total emissions per period: 
  ) ( i i q e E              (21) 
Total output per period:
    i q Q             (22)
 
When the total permit supply, which is equal to the total number of permit holding at the end of 
a compliance period, is lower than the aggregate emissions level under the business as usual 
scenario, some degree of abatement is required in the market.  
E L S             (23) 
Then some abatement level is required 
L E A                  (24) 
where        
  i a A
             (25)   21-Dec-10  22 
This holds both globally and for individual firms, as shown in equation (19). 
Given that  0  i v  and 
*   p f  ,  let    n j j i ,..., 1 , ,..., 1     and   
an aj aj a a c c c c c        ... ... 1 2 1   : 
a)  Firms    j i ,..., 1   are net sellers of permits, with 
* p cai  .  
Then, making an investment decision in abatement measures and selling the freely allocated 
permits is the best compliance strategy for firm i,    j i ,..., 1   .  
For net sellers, denoted by ns, total emissions are:  














1    
        (26)  
b)  Firm    n j i ,..., 1    are net buyers of permits, with 
* p cai  . 
Then, buying permits in the secondary market is the best compliance strategy for firm i, 
  n j i ,..., 1     and firm i are net buyers in the permit market.  
For net buyers (nb), total emissions are as follows:  














        (27) 
The efficient aggregate emissions level in the market is 
   
  









nb ns l a L A E E p E
1 1
*) (               (28) 
where 
     j i ai          0     and     1       0     j i li     Q.E.D.  
Corollary  2  Market  efficiency  is  achieved  when  all  firms  choose  their  profit-maximising 
compliance strategy at the equilibrium permit price. 






* * ... , , n i i i i market k l a                  (29) 
Suppose we have one firm i =1 which does not choose its best compliance strategy such that 
*




1 ...               Q.E.D.   21-Dec-10  23 
6.  Make-Good Provision  
Under the make-good provision penalty design (MGP), a restoration rate    determines the ratio 
at which a firm should have to compensate for its missing permits. For instance, if a firm has 3 
missed permits and  2   , then in the next period a firm should hold 6 more permits (additional 
to what it needs to surrender for that period). Hence this penalty design allows a borrowing 
provision  to  the  trading  scheme.  When   1   ,  the  make-good  provision  allows  for  perfect 
borrowing from one period to another. However  1      implies that there is an additional cost of 
borrowing. It can be said that the borrowing cost increases with a higher restoration rate. In 
practice, the presence of a discount rate can encourage firms to shift emissions today to the 
future in order to push the costs further in the future (Kling and Rubin, 1997). Nevertheless, the 
absolute  cost  of this  borrowing  provision  in  fact  also depends  on  the  permit  price  in  the 
following period. As a result, to analyse the effects of a MGP we need to develop a dynamic 
model. 
Under a MGP, firms will not be penalized with a penalty fee when they have missed permits at 
a particular period t. For the sake of simplicity, let t = 1, 2, where period one is the first year and 
period two is the last year of a phase of an emissions trading scheme. Compliance is ensured 
only through a restoration rate, which influences the initial allocation in period two. Thus the 
model is set such that the violation in the second period should be equal to zero. In practice, the 
regulator normally establishes a massive fine and/or serious legal consequences for violation at 
the end of a trading stage to ensure the firm‟s compliance in the market. In some countries, 
criminal charges or even incarceration are imposed in order to deter non-compliance in the 
market.  Hence, firms need to keep their total violations equal to zero. However, we do not take 
into  account  this  legal  implication  as  an  additional  compliance  cost,  rather  we  guarantee  a 
condition of perfect compliance by setting the second period violation at zero. 
It is assumed that the total number of permits will be equal to the total number of initial permits, 
which is constant in both periods. 
       2 2 1 1 i i s S s S           (30) 
Furthermore, the total number of permits is lower than the total initial emissions of all firms to 
create an incentive to invest in abatement technology. 











           (31) 
The decision-making stages in this model are similar to those in the FPR model. However, the 
following differences exist with regard to the investment decision:   21-Dec-10  24 
a)  Firms can only make investment decisions in the first period as a compliance strategy. This 
condition  reflects  the  irreversible  nature  of  investment.  If  firms  choose  to  invest,  the 
reduction in emissions will take place immediately, and the same abatement costs will also 
be incurred in the second period.  
    i i it it a c a c 2               (32)
 
If firms do not invest in the first period, they can only achieve compliance through permit 
trading. 
b)  After  the  investment  decision  stage,  firms  choose  their  compliance  in  period  one  by 
choosing their permit holdings in period one, denoted by li1. 
c)  In period two, firms choose their compliance strategy by determining their permit holdings 
in period two, denoted by li2. 
Let firm i‟s violation level in the first period be  
    0 1 1 1 1 1 1     i i i i i i l a k q e v            (33) 
The violation level in the second period is denoted by  
    0 2 2 2 2 2 2     i i i i i i l a k q e v           (34) 
Thus, firm i‟s total violation level for both periods is  
  2 1
2
1
i i it it
t
it l l a e v     
  
          (35) 
When the firm violates in the first period, its initial permit allocation in the second period is 
reduced proportionately by a factor of  .  
0 1  i v      1 1 1 2   i i i i s v s s               (36) 
Firm i‟s maximisation problem is 
   
    1 1 2 2 1 1 1
, , , ,
                                                        
        
2 1 2 1
i i i i i
it it it it it i l l a k k
v s l p s l p
a c k r k q Max
i i i i i


    
      
   (37) 
subject to     0 0 2 1   i i v v     ,  
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The Lagrangian equation for the profit maximisation problem is given by 
     
  2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 1
                                     
   
i i i i i
i i it i it it it
v v v s l p
s l p a c k r k q L
  

    
       
    (38) 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are 













































































              (39) 
0 2 2 1 2      
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                (42) 
    0 1 1 1 1
1
   


i i i i i l a k q e
L

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i i i i i l a k q e
L

            (43) 
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Proposition  3  The  firm  chooses  its  efficient  level  of  investment  in  abatement  measures  by 
equalising its marginal abatement cost to the permit prices in both periods. This follows the 
result under a fixed penalty rate design.  
Proof:  Assuming  an  interior  solution,  from  (41)  and  (42),  we  obtain  1 2 1 p p       and 
2 2 p    . These two equations are substituted back into equation (40) to obtain 
  0 2 2 1     p p cai               (45)   21-Dec-10  26 





















































             (46)  Q.E.D. 
This shows that the profit-maximising firm will increase its production level until the marginal 
revenue of production is equal to the sum of the marginal production cost and the marginal 
compliance cost under a permit market. In this sense, the degree of emissions increase that 
corresponds  to  a  production  increase  is  the  key  to  the  equation.  Although  we  consider 
decreasing emissions levels as a result of abatement, we have not discussed the effect of the 
firm‟s technology  i   on its emissions level: firms with cleaner technology have an advantage at 
a given level of capital. 






   . This proposition holds when we consider a zero discount rate, which otherwise 
would have made different implications.  
Corollary 3 When  2 1 p p  , increasing the restoration rate in the  make-good provision will 
lower the firm’s total violation level in period 1 as the cost of borrowing increases up until the 
restoration rate equals  one, beyond which the firm will find it optimal to have a zero total 
violation  level.  The  penalising  effect  of  the  borrowing  cost  will  be  higher  when  2 1 p p  . 
Accordingly,  when 2 1 p p  ,  the  optimal  restoration  rate  should  be  even  higher  than 
when 2 1 p p  . 
Proof: Based on equations (41) and (43), we derive 
0 1 2 1
1
   





















i i i i i i
i i
       (47)  
Taking the first derivation of equation (47) with respect to   , we obtain the marginal effect of 
the  restoration  rate  on  first -period  violations.  Since  0 2  p and  0 2  i v ,  increasing  the 
restoration rate will decrease the firm‟s total violation rate in the first period.   21-Dec-10  27 
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   
              (48)  
Optimal compliance in the first period is achieved by setting equation (47) equal to zero. Since 





  . When we have non-
zero discount rates, even higher levels of restoration rates are required, as the discount rate will 
reduce the value of the second period permit price. Q.E.D. 
For illustrative purposes, we conduct a simulation that involves keeping the permit prices the 
same in both periods,  2 1 p p   . We use a comparative static analysis with the same parameters 
and  functions  as  in  the  FPR  design :    , 15 . 0    , 05 . 0    ,     ,    ,
5 . 0 9 . 0 2      r k q q e a c   
02 . 0   2 1   p p . The results (Figure 2, below) indicate that, when the restoration rate is zero – 
which means that firms are not penalised for their missed permits in period one –, the violation 
level reaches the maximum level; this is correlated with the maximum production level. As the 
restoration  rate  increases,  the  violation  level  decreases  and  then  drops  to  zero  after  the 
restoration rate equals one.  
 
Figure 2  The Effect of Restoration Rates on Violation Levels under the MGP 
This result confirms that, when restoration rate equals one –implying perfect borrowing across 
the two periods under zero interest rate –, then firms are indifferent between violating in the first 
or second period. On the other hand, when the restoration rate is greater than one, the firm finds 
it more expensive to violate in period one because there is a higher cost of borrowing, and thus 
the firm keeps its first period violation rate to zero. As for the second period, the restoration rate 
(a)  The effect of restoration rates on the first 
period violation levels   
(b)  The effect of restoration rates on the second period 
violation levels     21-Dec-10  28 
has no effects in this model and the violation levels always equal to zero as the setting of the 
model.  
As shown in Figure 3, the restoration rate will affect the amount of capital use in the first 
period, but not in the second period. Since the model requires perfect compliance in the second 
period, the capital use in the second period is the same as the optimal capital use for the static 
model. In the first period, firms still have both options of compliance strategies and permit 
buying decision is influenced by the restoration rate. When the restoration rate is less than one, 
firm incurs cheaper compliance costs by shifting its permit buying to the second period. Hence, 
increases in the restoration rate are matched by decreases in the first period capital use because 
the  restoration  rate  represents  increasing  compliance  costs.  This  pattern  continues  until  the 
restoration rate equals one, after which firms find it optimal to have a zero first period violation 
by holding an optimal amount of capital under an emissions trading scheme.  
 
Figure 3 The Effect of Restoration Rates on Production Levels under the MGP 
With regard to the choice of compliance strategies, the effect of restoration rate is as expected 
(Figure  4).  Holding  everything  else  constant,  profit-maximising  firms  will  increase  their 
abatement levels with a higher restoration rate, and firms find the efficient abatement level 
when the restoration rate reaches one. Accordingly, in the first period, firms will not hold any 
permits when the restoration rate is still below one, because it will be cheaper for them to invest 
in  abatement  or  violate  and  shift  the  purchase  of  permits  to  the  second  period.  When  the 
restoration rate exceeds one, then firms should hold the efficient number of permits. This result 
also explains why the violation level in the first period is positive when the restoration rate is 
less  than  one.  Likewise,  in  the  second  period,  firms  hold  the  efficient  number  of  permits 
regardless of the restoration rate after the restoration rate reaches one. 
(a)  The effect of restoration rates on the first 
period capital use (production levels)   
(b)  The effect of restoration rates on the second 
period capital use (production levels)     21-Dec-10  29 
 
Figure 4 The Effect of Restoration Rates on Compliance Strategies under the MGP 
Proposition 5  When the restoration rate is set at the optimal level, this restoration rate affects 
the firm’s compliance strategies because it forces the firm to be compliant by either making an 
efficient investment in abatement measures or holding the efficient number of permits.  
Proof  From equation (40) and (43) we derive the effect of the restoration rate on the amount of 
abatement. 
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By re-arranging the terms, we obtain a new function ,   a g ,  that  is  expressed  in  terms  of 
abatement level.    
(a)  The effect of restoration rates on abatement levels 
(b)  The effect of restoration rates on the first 
period permit holdings   
(c)  The effect of restoration rates on the second 
period permit holdings     21-Dec-10  30 
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Taking the first derivative of    a g
 
with regard to the restoration rate yields 
 
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As  0 2  p ,  the  increasing  restoration  rate  will  increase  the  firm‟s  abatement  level  until  it 
reaches the efficient abatement level under the optimal restoration rate. When
*    , it will be 
optimal  for the firm  to  be  non-compliant,  and  hence,  it  has  a  positive  violation  in  the  first 
period.  With  regard  to  permit  holding,  a  non-compliant  firm  does  not  need  to  buy  permits, 
as 0 0 1 1    i i l  . However, when 
*    ,  compliance becomes an optimal strategy for the 
firm, and hence it will hold the efficient number of permits,  0 0 1 1    i i l   . Q.E.D. 
7.  Mixed Penalty Design 
Under the mixed penalty design (MIX), firms will be penalized with a restoration rate when 
they violate in the first period and will also be fined with a fixed rate, f , for their total violation 
level in both periods. The assumptions in this model follow from both the Fixed Penalty Rate 
(FPR) and Make-Good Provision (MGP) model. The important difference is that we allow for 
non-compliance in the second period, which is not the case in the MGP model. As before, it is 
assumed that we have a zero discount rate. 
Firm i‟s maximisation problem: 
   
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subject to    0 0 2 1   i i v v     ,  
The Lagrangian equation from the profit maximisation problem: 
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The first-order conditions are obtained from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions: 
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Proposition 6 Under the mixed penalty design, the same results as in FPR and MGP models are 
derived  in  which  the  firm  maximizes  its  profit  by  equalizing  its  marginal  benefit  after 
compliance cost to its marginal cost of production.  
Corollary 4  The efficient level of investment in abatement measures is attained by setting the 
firm’s marginal abatement cost equal to the permit price in both periods. 
Proof: Assuming an interior solution, we derive  1 2 1 p f p       and   2 2 p f      from 
(55) and (56). We substitute these equations into equation (54) to obtain the efficient choice of 
abatement level: 
0 2 2 1     p p ca               (59) 
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i              (60)   Q.E.D. 
As with the MGP, firms will be profit-maximising when the marginal revenue in each period is 
equal to the sum of capital rent and marginal compliance cost.  
To determine the efficient penalty level in the MIX, we need to look at each penalty element 
separately and then assess what happens when we vary their levels. Based on the first conditions 
(FOC), we see two differences between the MIX and the MGP. Firstly, the fixed penalty rate 
now appears in both equations of partial derivative to permit holding in each period (55) and 
(56). Secondly, the sign of the partial derivative to the Lagrange multiplier with regard to the 
second period violation has changed because the MIX allows for non-zero violation. These 
changes lead to different implication in setting the efficient level of each penalty. 
Proposition 7 Under the mixed penalty design, the firm’s compliance in the first period can be 
achieved by setting either the fixed penalty rate or the restoration rate at an efficient level. 
However, compliance in the second period is only attained by setting 2 p f  .  
Corollary  5  In  the  presence  of  a  double  penalty  in  the  mixed  penalty  design,  stronger 
compliance incentives are observed than in other models and market efficiency is retained as in 
the other models.   
Proof: Focusing on compliance decisions in the first period, we set equations (55) and (57) 
equal to zero to attain 
    0 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1            f p p l a k q e i i i i i i           (61)
 
Since      0 1   , we can determine the efficient level of the fixed penalty rate. 
 2 1 p p f                     (62) 
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Both equations reveal that even if either    0  f or    0   , the other penalty type will still have a 
positive  value  and  hold the  firm‟s  compliance  at  the  efficient  level.  In  the  second  period, 
however, firm‟s compliance relies only on the FPR.   21-Dec-10  33 
From (56) and (57), we obtain 
      0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2           f p l a k q e i i i i i i            (64) 
Since      0 2   , we derive the efficient fixed penalty rate for the second sub period 
  2 p f                 (65)    Q.E.D. 
As in the previous penalty designs, we run a simulation; the same parameters and functions are 
used:  02 . 0    , 15 . 0    , 05 . 0    ,     ,    , 2 1
5 . 0 9 . 0 2        p p r k q q e a c  . Additionally, we set 
1    to determine the effect of an increasing penalty rate under the MIX. In general, the same 
effect as that in the FPR is obtained; a higher penalty rate decreases violation level until the 
efficient penalty rate is achieved. The difference is the efficient level of penalty. As seen from 
Figure 5, the presence of a restoration rate changes the efficient penalty level in the first period 
to a lower rate than it would be under the FPR alone because the restoration rate increases the 
cost of being non-compliance. Obviously, the efficient level of penalty will change accordingly 
depending  on  the  restoration  rate  as  determined  by  equation  (62).  On  the  contrary,  a  much 
higher efficient level of penalty rate is required in the second period under a restoration rate than 
under an FPR. This illustrates the implication of the comparative static result in equation (65). 
Figure 5 The Effect of Penalty Rates on the Firm’s Violation Levels under the MIX  
The simulation results of the comparative statics on capital use show that the double penalty in 
the first period forces the firm to choose its efficient production level regardless of the penalty 
rate. When the effect of restoration rate is removed in the second period, the penalty rate has a 
similar effect as that of the FPR. 
(a)  The effect of penalty rates on the first period 
violation level under the MIX 
(b)  The effect of penalty rates on the second period 
violation level under the MIX    21-Dec-10  34 
Figure 6  The Effects of Penalty Rates on Production Levels under the MIX 
 
 Figure 7  The Effect of Penalty Rates on Compliance Strategies under the MIX  
(b)  The effect of penalty rates on the first period 
permit holding under the MIX   
(c)  The effect of penalty rates on the second period 
permit holding under the MIX   
(a)  The effect of penalty rates on abatement levels under the MIX   
(a)  The effect of penalty rates on the first period 
capital use (production levels) under the MIX 
(b)  The effect of penalty rates on the second period 
capital use (production levels) under the MIX   21-Dec-10  35 
Compliance strategies under the mixed penalty design are affected by the penalty rate in fairly 
the same way as with the violation level and production level (capital use). Contrary to the 
effect on the second period capital use, increases in the penalty rate raise abatement levels until 
the efficient level is reached. The first period permit holding is increasing in the penalty rate 
until it reaches the efficient level. As in the case of violation level, a higher level of efficient 
penalty rate is required before permit holding in the second period achieves its equilibrium. 
The restoration rate does not have a significant effect when an efficient level of penalty rate is 
enforced.  A  simulation  of  the  comparative  statics  analysis  is  performed  using  the  same 
parameters and functions as before, but with the penalty rate set at 04 . 0  f , which is twice the 
permit price.  
 
Figure 8  The   Effect of  Restoration  Rates on  Violation  and  Production  Levels  under 
the MIX 
(a)  The effect of restoration rates on the first period 
violations under the MIX   
(c)  The effect of restoration rates on the first 
period permit holding under the MIX   
(d)  The effect of restoration rates on the second 
period permit holding under the MIX   
(b)  The effect of restoration rates on the first period 
violations under the MIX     21-Dec-10  36 
When we look at the violation level and production level, the simulation results indicate that the 
restoration rate does not play a role in determining the efficient level of those variables given 
that  the  penalty  rate  is  established  at  the  efficient  level.  Likewise,  Figure  9  shows  that  all 
compliance strategy variables reach their efficient levels immediately at the beginning. Hence, 
the MIX model seems to guarantee that firms arrive at the efficient level of abatement and 
permit holding immediately, which is different compared to the other models. Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that the strong compliance incentive under the MIX does not compromise market 
efficiency as proven by equation (60). 
 




(a)  The effect of restoration rates on abatement level under the MIX   
(b)  The effect of restoration rates on the first 
period permit holding under the MIX   
(c)  The effect of restoration rates on the second 
period permit holding under the MIX     21-Dec-10  37 
8.  Discussion  
As mentioned earlier, a theoretical model has the advantage of the simplicity of stylised facts. 
Nevertheless, some key issues related to the complexity of an emissions trading scheme need to 
be considered in order to gain an understanding of the implications that our results might have 
in practice. 
One of the important functions of an emissions trading scheme is its role in the process of price 
discovery of the regulated pollutant. Typically, there is very little information about the permit 
price at the beginning of a trading scheme. At that point, the fixed penalty rate (f) is practically 
the first price signal received by firms, apart from their own marginal abatement cost, of the 
maximum compliance cost. We can thus see the penalty rate as a focal point that serves as the 
first external reference on which firms can base their compliance decisions. These decisions will 
be adjusted as firms receive more price signals from the permit markets. On this ground, the 
initial allocation rule might actually influence the process of price discovery. This shows that 
the  assumption  of  perfect  information  is  crucial  for  Montgomery‟s  finding  (1972)  that  the 
mechanism used to distribute initial permits to each firm should not affect the firm‟s behaviour 
in  making  an  optimal  decision.  In  his  model  he  assumed  that  each  firm  should  be  able  to 
calculate the equilibrium permit price. In the case of grandfathering, price signals are generated 
by the secondary market. When permits are initially auctioned, firms will gain more signals at 
the earlier stage of a trading scheme about the expected permit price. Thus it is expected that 
there will be a faster convergence path to the efficient equilibrium when permits are auctioned 
off.  
Another important issue to address in practice is the assumption of perfect information on the 
regulator‟s  part  that  is  used  in  the  model.    By  and  large,  a  regulating  authority  does  not 
necessarily  have  all  the  required  information  on  the  firm‟s  characteristics  or  emissions 
inventories,  let  alone  its  marginal  abatement  costs.  Thus  the  authority  makes  its  choice  of 
marginal  penalty  rate  under  imperfect  information  (e.g.  uncertainty  about  future  emissions, 
perceptions about the risk of illiquidity in permit market). In such a situation, high penalty 
levels might lead to overinvestment in reduction measures because the cost of potentially being 
non-compliant for firms will be high compared to the cost of reducing emissions under the 
presence of uncertainties regarding permit prices. This effect may increase when the number of 
permits is fixed, which means that the supply of permits will be inelastic in the short run. On the 
contrary, the penalty level may be set lower than the true equilibrium price, acting as a price cap 
that provides lower investment incentives.   21-Dec-10  38 
Under  the  absence  of  perfect  information  about  the  equilibrium  permit  price,  there  is  no 
certainty that the penalty rate will always be above the equilibrium permit price, which is a very 
crucial issue especially if the penalty rate also functions as a price cap. Hence, the question 
about the level of the penalty rate becomes relevant.  This concern has prompted the idea of 
tying the penalty rate to an auction price to bring the penalty rate closer to the permit price and 
at the same time guarantee that the penalty rate will always be higher than the permit price 
given  that  the  auction  price  is  a  good  proxy  of  the  permit  price.  The  Australian  federal 
government has put forward this concept in its proposal for the Australian trading scheme (the 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme), in which the penalty rate is suggested to be capped at 
110% of the benchmark average auction price. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, in 
practice, strategic bidding behaviour might drive down auction prices as firms understand that 
their bids will determine the maximum cost of compliance. Furthermore, this penalty design 
might create additional cost uncertainty as the level of penalty varies in auction prices that 
implies an uncertainty regarding the maximum cost of compliance, which in turn will influence 
compliance  decisions.  In  an  extreme  case,  market  players might  collude  to drive  down  the 
auction price to zero, creating a zero compliance cost. However, it is unlikely that the regulator 
would allow this to happen, as the auction process should be designed to prevent such collusion 
from occurring and most auctions set a reserve price for that purpose. Most existing schemes, as 
shown by the rules applied by some Member States in the European Emissions Trading Scheme, 
also have additional penalties making violations a criminal offense and thus encourage further 
compliance by market players (Schleich et al., 2009).  Firms are also exposed to additional 
reputational costs when they are non-compliant. In spite of this, it is worth noting the potential 
drawbacks of tying the penalty rate to the equilibrium permit price. 
The use of a mixed penalty system should not affect the efficient compliance strategies of firms, 
whether compliance is achieved through investment in abatement or through permit trading.  
Although this penalty design is perceived as a double penalty, under perfect knowledge about 
the equilibrium permit price and as long as the level of both the penalty rate and the restoration 
rate are set at the efficient level, in theory the efficient market condition is retained. However, 
this double penalty might have more deterrent effect for risk averse market players and may 
encourage over-investment in abatement.  
When a penalty rate and a restoration rate co-exist as a penalty design, firms arrive at the 
optimal compliance strategies earlier than they do under the other penalty designs. Based on the 
comparative statics analysis, the fixed penalty rate seems to have a more prominent effect on 
compliance strategy than the restoration rate. Yet, the theoretical result rejects some concern 
that the MIX model will yield a lower efficiency level given the double penalty.    21-Dec-10  39 
As shown in Table 1, the mixed penalty design seems to be favoured in practice, such as in the 
US Acid Rain Program, the EU ETS, the RGGI and the emerging schemes. This seems to be in 
line  with  the  theoretical  findings  as  stronger  compliance  incentives  encourage  faster 
convergence toward the optimal compliance strategies. 
9.  Conclusion 
Penalty design is an important element of permit markets that ensures that the market is capable 
of achieving both environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency. Our model shows that 
different  penalty  designs  in  the  form  of  the  fixed  penalty  rate  (FPR)  and  the  make-good 
provision (MGP) do not yield different results in terms of firms optimal compliance strategy as 
long as the penalty level is set at the efficient level such that the penalty rate is greater than the 
permit price and the restoration rate is greater than ratio of the permit price in the first period to 
the permit price in the second period. For the mixed penalty design, perfect compliance in the 
first  period  can  be  achieved  by  setting  either  the  penalty  rate  or the  restoration  rate  at  the 
efficient level. Nevertheless, the penalty rate element evidently plays a more important role to 
ensure compliance in the second period.  
Efficiency in a permit market should be maintained regardless of the penalty design, provided 
that each firm chooses its best compliance strategy and maximizes its profit by equalizing its 
marginal benefit to its marginal cost of production including compliance cost. Hence, if there is 
a firm in the market that does not choose its best compliance strategy, then market efficiency 
will be compromised. 
Lastly,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  final  effects  of  different  penalty  designs  on  market 
efficiency are also influenced by the firms‟ risk attitudes, which are reflected in both investment 
levels and the number of permit holding. On this ground, either the distance of the penalty level 
from the equilibrium permit price or the penalty type itself, which is not an issue in theory, 
might be a crucial design element for the regulator to consider. We therefore suggest that further 
research in this area is important and that experimental testing seems to be a fruitful approach to 
further investigate penalty design implications.   
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